“Leave the talk that this is a local or regional war. The entire Western world is at war with the Russians through the Ukrainians, it is almost a global conflict. The only thing missing is a significant conflict in Asia,” Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić spoke about world affairs in an interview with TV Pink the other day. Vučić is among those political leaders who cannot in any way influence the settlement of contradictions related to the war in Eastern Europe, but at the same time Serbia is among the countries dependent on cooperation with both Russia and the West.
Since the beginning of the war, Vučić, in the face of clearly increased pressure on him, has been sending out various signals to partners in the East and West, presenting some of his steps as forced and emphasizing the desire to protect Serbian interests. Thus, he partially compensated for his refusal to impose sanctions against Russia by supporting several international resolutions condemning Moscow's actions. Some observers were surprised that Serbia did not take the opportunity to "abstain" from voting on the suspension of Russia's membership in the UN Human Rights Council. But Vučić probably feared that Western partners would perceive this as "support for the aggressor."
Vucic told the Russian audience that he acted under pressure from Western countries, and to Western countries that he supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine and considered the Russian operation a mistake, but he should think about the interests of his own country, which, as he recalls, was bombed in 1999 by powerful NATO countries. He considers the sanctions themselves ineffective.
Vucic told the Russian audience that he acted under pressure from the West, and to the West that he considers the Russian operation a mistake.
gas trap
As a candidate for EU membership, Serbia has faced years of pressure to align its foreign policy with that of Europe, but it also has to deal with Moscow, which provides diplomatic support on Kosovo and sets the price of gas. This price, as you know, is formed under the influence of various political factors, and the Serbian authorities would like to avoid additional risks, given the almost 100% dependence on Russian supplies and the simple fact that a real alternative that would completely exclude cooperation with Gazprom, on currently does not exist in the region. By the way, the latest contract, which Vucic agreed with the Kremlin at the end of May, is no longer as profitable as the previous one (the new price is about $400 per thousand cubic meters of gas instead of 270), and ahead is a difficult, according to the Serbian leader himself, winter and possible development of the conflict according to the worst scenario.
After the April elections, in which Vucic retained his presidential mandate and control over parliament, the US and the EU expected Belgrade to more noticeably distance itself from the Kremlin. But significant adjustments in the Russian direction have not yet occurred. At the same time, without objective reasons, Vucic is delaying the formation of a new government, in which conditionally pro-Russian (like Defense Minister Alexander Vulin) and pro-Western figures are usually represented. Some observers believe that the absence of a new cabinet serves as an obstacle to the much-desired reassessment of relations with Russia. A new cabinet, judging by information from pro-government media, can only be formed in August. It seems that the Serbian leader is trying to use every constitutional opportunity to delay the imposition of sanctions, especially since the gas storage facilities are not yet full.
And although the Serbian authorities have repeatedly promised not to impose an embargo, this position is not so firm. Vucic himself stated that he would oppose anti-Russian sanctions until "Serbia is forced to do otherwise." The Serbian leader put these words in the context of European integration, which remains a strategic goal for Belgrade. Calls for Belgrade to align its policies with the EU do not yet threaten to block the Serbian European path, but the war in Ukraine, candidate status and the issue of sanctions are usually mentioned in the same context. In this sense, it cannot be ruled out that Serbia's European integration prospects will soon be called into question if it refuses to distance itself from Moscow.
An accomplice to Kremlin disinformation
Since the beginning of the war, not a single high-ranking Russian figure has been received in Belgrade. At the end of February, the visit of Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Russian Security Council, was canceled , and in June, the widely announced visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was canceled because Bulgaria, Montenegro and North Macedonia did not give permission to fly through their airspace. And while the Serbian leaders showed chagrin at this, they most likely breathed a sigh of relief. They didn't have to be nice to him in front of the TV cameras amid growing accusations of massive war crimes and provide a platform for traditional anti-Western statements.
Since the beginning of the war, not a single high-ranking Russian official has been received in Belgrade
On the other hand, Vučić has more than once been caught facilitating Kremlin propaganda and disinformation: Serb pro-government media often lean towards a pro-Kremlin narrative when covering events around Ukraine. For example, the tabloid Informer, which is close to the Serbian authorities, was one of the publications that, after the start of the Russian invasion, published a front-page message that "Ukraine attacked Russia." This fake has not been refuted and is still available to readers. The Serbian authorities have long assisted the Kremlin in promoting its information policy. In particular, Belgrade tried to assist the work of the RT propaganda channel in Europe. The German-language TV channel RT auf Deutsch (RT DE), launched at the end of last year under a Serbian license, was quickly taken off the air, and the whole story turned into a scandal.
Vucic himself sometimes makes strange, not based on facts statements. Thus, in the already mentioned interview with TV Pink, the Serbian leader argued that the world would be plunged into hell if world leaders did not heed the proposals of Russian President Vladimir Putin. “I know what awaits us. As soon as Putin finishes business in Seversk, Artyomovsk, Bakhmut and Soledar, and then on the second line: Slavyansk - Kramatorsk - Avdeevka, his proposal will follow. If they do not accept it, and they do not intend to do so (which is logical), we will go to hell, ”Vucic argued. This quote in the original can be heard here , starting at 1:49:00.
The words of the Serbian president, consonant with the statements of Russian propagandists about "nuclear ash", were immediately replicated by the Russian media and pro-Kremlin publications in the Balkans. Some participants in the discussions on Internet forums were surprised by the knowledge of the Serbian president: “The Serb is good at information. He voiced all the cities clearly and along the lines. But something else is surprising: Vučić, who usually does not talk about the details of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, undertook to comment on the situation in the war zone and confidently predict some terrible outcome, increasing the atmosphere of fear in the Balkans and without disclosing the details of Putin's plan allegedly known to him. The journalist, who talked with the Serbian leader for about two hours and tried to look meticulous, was not interested in these details either. Vucic most likely lied, but in this context, his statements look like complicity in the Kremlin's campaign of disinformation and intimidation.
Serbia is one of the few countries where rallies in support of the Kremlin's policies have taken place since the start of the Russian offensive in Ukraine, and where graffiti depicting Putin or the letter "Z", which is one of the symbols of the invasion, periodically appear. It was under Vučić that studies show that Serbia opened the door to Russian influence and the spread of pro-Kremlin sympathies in the region. Dozens of pro-Russian organizations with unclear funding have appeared here, which are engaged in promoting a conservative agenda, a positive image of Putin, distorting the concept of democracy and demonizing the West.
No further convergence
Vučić, who knows how to use the sympathy of the Serbian electorate for Russia better than others, does not interfere. On the contrary, it gives him the opportunity to demonstrate to the West that he has an "alternative". And while the Serbian authorities have no intention of abandoning membership in the European Union, which accounts for almost two-thirds of Serbian trade and investment, or starting to deepen integration within the framework of the EEU created by the Kremlin, they are trying to use the Russian factor and ambiguous signals to reduce pressure from the West. First of all, this concerns the issue of Kosovo: Vučić would like to delay as much as possible the recognition of the independence of the breakaway province with a 90% Albanian population, which is essentially inevitable with EU integration.
The Kremlin - and this is especially important for it in the context of the protracted conflict in Ukraine - will try to maintain a "strategic partnership" with a country that remains a springboard for Russian influence in the Balkans with their unfinished conflicts and integration projects. And although events such as the disruption of Lavrov’s visit to Belgrade confirm the limited instruments of Russian influence, the very fact that Serbia remains a kind of “ally” and does not allow building a united anti-Kremlin front in Europe, from a propaganda point of view, is very significant.
Belgrade has demonstrated tolerance for the Kremlin's foreign policy ambitions for many years. Even after the annexation of Crimea, the Serbian authorities (although they did not recognize Crimea as Russian) continued to expand military ties with Russia and security cooperation. Joint exercises were held twice a year, Belgrade willingly accepted Russian military equipment as a gift. However, there will most likely be no further rapprochement, especially since anti-Russian voices are sounding louder and louder in the Serbian political elite.
If the conflict drags on, Belgrade will have to rethink relations with Moscow so as not to risk ties with the main financial donors and security guarantors in the Balkans. The continuation of the war leads to a long-term isolation of Russia, colossal damage to its economy and a weakening of global influence, which automatically makes it an inconvenient and unprofitable partner. In Serbia's foreign economic relations before the war, Russia ranked fourth (after Germany, Italy and China) with a volume of mutual trade of $ 2.5 billion, slightly ahead of such countries as Hungary and Romania. The volume of Russian investments in Serbia is estimated at $3 billion. In the coming years, these figures will obviously worsen, and Russia will not be able to afford large-scale projects in the Balkans for a long time to come.
